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COMMENTS 
ATLANTIS REVISITED: RECOVERY UNDER MARYLAND 
LAW FOR PURELY ECONOMIC LOSS AGAINST 
NEGLIGENT BUILDERS AND MANUFACTURERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, building contractors and product manufacturers 
were not liable in tort for either personal injury or property damage 
to parties with whom they had no privity. 1 Building contractors owed 
duties only to· those parties with whom they had a contract,2 and 
not to the homeowner or third parties. Likewise, manufacturers owed 
duties only by virtue of their contract with the immediate purchaser 
of their product-either the distributor or the retailer-but not to 
the product's ultimate user. 3 
In the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.,4 
the New York Court of Appeals abolished the requirement of privity 
in negligence actions against manufacturers of defective products. 5 
Judge Cardozo, writing for the court, held that a manufacturer may 
be liable in tort "irrespective of contract" for personal injuries 
1. For most of the 19th century, courts in both the United States and England 
denied negligence claims in the absence of privity of contract. In the seminal 
case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), the English Court 
of Exchequer held that an injured passenger of a mail coach did not have a 
cause of action against the party under contract with the owner to keep the 
coach in repair. Id. at 404-06. According to the court, allowing a party not in 
privity to maintain an action would lead to "the most absurd and outrageous 
consequences, to which I can see no limit." Id. at 405. See also Ford v. 
Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (denying recovery in tort to estate of 
theater patron killed by collapse of theater); Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing 
Mach. Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (denying recovery in tort to an employee 
who suffered physical injury from defendant manufacturer's threshing ma-
chine). 
2. Typically, these parties are the developer or other subcontractors, including 
architects, surveyors and engineers. Annotation, Negligence oj Building or 
Construction Contractor as Ground oj Liability upon His Part jor Injury or 
Damage 10 Third Person Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of the 
Work, 58 A.L.R.20 865 (1958). 
3. See generally Michael D. Leider, Constructing a New Action for Negligent 
Infliction of Economic Loss: Building on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. 
REV. 937, 943-44 (1991). 
4. III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
5. In MacPherson, the plaintiff was injured when a defective wheel on his 
automobile collapsed. Id. at 1051. He sued the manufacturer of the wheel 
despite the absence of privity. Id. 
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resulting from its negligence. 6 Cardozo noted that the court "put 
aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb ... grows 
out of contract and nothing else."7 
The privity requirement has likewise been abolished in negligence 
actions against building contractors where personal injury is in-
volved. s In Inman v. Binghamton Housing AuthoritY,9 a negligence 
action was brought against the architect of an apartment building 
for personal injuries suffered by a child who fell from a defective 
concrete porch. IO The New York Court of Appeals denied the archi-
tect's privity defense and found that there was no meaningful dis-
tinction between injuries caused by chattels, as in MacPherson, and 
those involving building structures. I I 
The trend towards relaxation of the privity requirement has been 
slow to catch hold in cases where the resulting harm is characterized 
as an "economic loss." Generally, an economic loss is the loss of 
an expectancy interest created by contract, and occurs when a product 
or a building proves inferior in quality or does not perform for the 
purposes for which it is intended. 12 Economic losses may include 
such things as the loss of value or use of the product or building, 
the cost to repair or replace the product or building, or the lost 
profits resulting from the loss of use.13 
6. Id. at 1053, 1057. 
7. Id. at 1053. 
8. See generally 3 F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.5, at 708-11 (2d 
ed. 1986) (delineating the erosion of privity in construction); James M. Dente, 
Negligence Liability to all Foreseeable Parties for Pure Economic Harm: The 
Final Assault upon the Citadel, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 587-89 (1986). 
9. 143 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957). 
10. Id. at 897. 
11. Id. at 898-99. 
12. See generally Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for 
Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.c. L. REV. 891, 894-97 (1989) 
(reviewing history of economic loss doctrine); Comment, Manufacturers' Lia-
bility to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages- Tort or Con-
tract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966). The courts seldom adhere to a 
consistent definition of what types of damages are encompassed within the 
term "economic loss" and, in fact, are often simply confused by the entire 
issue. See Christopher C. Fallon, Jr., Physical Injury and Economic Loss-
The Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer, 27 VILL. L. REV. 483, 484-85 
(1981-82). For example, in Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 
1976), the court 3tated that all injuries, whether to person or property, 
ultimately result in economic loss. Id. at 621. See also Cosmopolitan Homes, 
Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1044 n.5 (Colo. 1983) (citing Barnes for the 
proposition that "both injury to one's person and injury to one's property 
result in economic loss"). 
13. A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 250, 634 A.2d 
1330, 1332 (1994); see also Barrett, supra note 12, at 892 n.!. For instance, if 
a farmer purchases a new tractor and finds that a part has to be replaced at 
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Because an economic loss is predicated upon the existence of a 
contract, courts have often been reluctant to allow a third person 
who is not a party to the contract to recover purely economic losses.14 
Historically, however, courts have not denied the recovery of eco-
nomic losses to third parties in all circumstances. It is well-settled, 
for instance, that a third party may recover against building con-
tractors or manufacturers for economic loss as a "parasitic" 
damagel5-that is, when the economic loss is accompanied by physical 
harm to person or property. 16 The long-standing debate has been 
whether, absent privity of contract, a plaintiff may recover economic 
losses in a negligence action where there is no accompanying physical 
damage to person or property other than to the product or the 
structure itself.17 The general rule adhered to by a majority of the 
states in both the manufacturing and construction contexts is often 
referred to as the "economic loss doctrine." Simply stated, with or 
without privity of contract, the economic loss doctrine holds that 
there is "no general duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid intan-
gible economic loss or losses that do not arise from tangible physical 
harm to persons and tangible things." 18 
a cost of $500, this would be an economic loss. If the farmer also suffered 
$1000 in lost profits' to his business while the tractor was being repaired, this 
too would be an economic loss. 
14. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 
93, at 668-69 (5th ed. 1984). 
15. Dente, supra note 8, at 589 n.20. 
16. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 129, at 997. As the court stated in the 
oft-cited case, People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Conrail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 
(N.J. 1985): 
The single characteristic that distinguishes parties in negligence suits 
whose claims for economic losses have been regularly denied by 
American and English courts from those who have recovered economic 
losses is, with respect to the successful claimants, the fortuitous 
occurrence of physical harm or property damage, however slight. It 
is well-accepted that a defendant who riegligently injures a plaintiff 
or his property may be liable for all proximately caused harm, 
including economic losses. 
ld. at 109. 
Even in cases where the plaintiff has suffered physical harm and economic 
loss, the courts have recognized that the defendant is not liable for each and 
every consequence of his conduct, but only those that he proximately caused. 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928). 
17. When economic loss has been sustained without any accompanying physical 
damage, other than to the product itself, most courts and commentators 
characterize the resultant harm as "pure economic harm." This Comment will 
use this definition of the term. 
18. KEETON ET AL, supra note 14, § 92, at 657. This rule was consistently applied 
throughout the earlier part of this century. For instance, in the early case of 
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), the Supreme 
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There is little authority in Maryland regarding the rights of third 
parties to recover under the economic loss doctrine. The state's courts 
have adopted the rule of MacPherson,19 and generally recognize that 
privity is not required for a third party to maintain a negligence 
action against a manufacturer for either personal injury or property 
damage. 2o The courts, however, have yet to identify fully in what 
instances purely economic losses are recoverable by third parties in 
tort actions against manufacturers and building contractors. A 1986 
decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland sheds light on the 
current status of the economic loss doctrine in Maryland. In Council 
oj Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 21 the court held that 
privity is not an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a 
tort duty .... [T]he duty of builders and architects ... to 
u~e due care in the design, inspection, and construction of 
a building extends to those persons foreseeably subjected to 
the risk of personal injury because of a latent and unrea-
sonably dangerous condition resulting from that negli-
gence .... [W]here the dangerous condition is discovered 
before it results in injury, an action in negligence will lie 
for the recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the 
condition.22 
The Atlantis decision is a significant clarification of the status 
of both the privity defense and the economic loss doctrine in negli-
Court denied recovery in negligence to time charterers who lost profits when 
the vessel they chartered was damaged while being repaired by the defendant 
dry dock company. [d. at 307. Justice Holmes found that the contract was 
between the dry dock company and the owners of the vessel; accordingly, the 
time charterers did not have a claim in contract or in tort for the lost profits. 
[d. at 309-10. See also Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903) (denying 
recovery to owner of printing plant for lost profits incurred when defendant 
negligently damaged electrical conduits that supplied power to the plant); 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (denying 
recovery to lender in negligence action against borrower's accountant for 
economic loss incurred as a result of reliance on a negligently prepared balance 
sheet); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) 
(denying recovery of lost wages to employee who was unable to work as a 
result of negligent rupture of stored natural gas tank at defendant's nearby 
utility plant). 
19. III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
20. See, e.g., Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 
1971); Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958); Kaplan v. Stein, 
198 Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81 (1951); Excavation Constr., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, 
Inc., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1981). 
21. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986). 
22. [d. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338. 
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gence actions brought by third parties. The court of appeals not only 
rejected the privity defense and adopted, for the first time, a standard 
of foreseeability in determining the tort liability of building contrac-
tors to third parties, but it also suggested that purely economic loss 
may be recovered in such actions. The plaintiffs in Atlantis incurred 
neither property damage nor actual personal injury. By awarding 
them the reasonable cost of correcting dangerous building conditions 
where the mere risk of personal injury was present, the court effec-
tively granted damages for purely economic loss.' As the court rea-
soned, "the determination of whether a duty will be imposed in this 
type of case should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent 
conduct, rather than the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the 
resultant damage. "23 
In Maryland's products liability area, two recent appellate de-
cisions have applied the "risk of harm" approach set forth in 
Atlantis.24 Although neither decision awarded the plaintiff economic 
losses, it is now evident that under Maryland law, a purchaser of a 
defective product may recover under a negligence theory for purely 
economic losses, including harm to the product itself, if the defect 
in the product causes a dangerous condition creating a risk of death 
or personal injury to the purchaser. 2s 
This Comment. first discusses some of the underpinnings of the 
economic loss doctrine, including policy reasons for its adoption. 
Second, this Comment explores the current viability of the economic 
loss doctrine in the United States and, in particular, under Maryland 
law in the areas of products liability and negligent construction.26 
Finally, this Comment will close with a discussion of Atlantis and 
other recent decisions, and their potential impact on the recovery of 
purely economic losses in Maryland. 
II. UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
One of the primary reasons advanced by the courts and various 
commentators in support of the economic loss doctrine is that re-
. 23. [d. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345. Several other states have expressly denied recovery 
in tort for the mere risk of harm. See, e.g., Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. 
Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel 
Tube Corp., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983) (denying recovery in tort for expenses 
undertaken to repair defective parts of a crane which was in danger of 
collapsing); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49 
(S.D. Ohio 1986). 
24. A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330 
(1994); Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 99 Md. App. 646, 639 A.2d 147 
(1994). 
25. A.J. Decoster, 333 Md. at 251-54, 634 A.2d at 1333-34; Morris, 99 Md. App. 
at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152. 
26. This Comment superficially covers the recovery of pure economic losses under 
other causes of action such as strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligent 
misrepresentation. See infra part II I.D. 
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co very of economic losses under tort law principles would expose 
contractors and manufacturers "to liability in an indeterminate amount 
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. "27 As one 
commentator accurately noted, "only a limited amount of physical 
damage can ever ensue from a single act, while the number of 
economic interests a tortfeasor may destroy in a brief moment of 
carelessness is practically limitless. "28 For example, a driver who 
negligently causes a traffic accident during rush hour would certainly 
be responsible for the personal injuries suffered by those involved in 
the accident. It is doubtful, however, that the driver would also be 
held responsible for the provable losses suffered by truck drivers 
who were delayed as a result of the rush hour traffic jam or to the 
employee who was forced to clock in at work an hour late. 29 In 
order to place manageable limits on liability in negligence actions, 
the requirement of some type of physical harm, measurable and 
identifiable, has been established as a necessary element of the causal 
relationship between a plaintiff's economic harm and the defendant's 
negligence.3o Most courts, therefore, have recognized that economic 
loss is recoverable only when it is accompanied by physical damage, 
such as parasitic damage.3l When only economic harm is incurred, 
the courts have traditionally denied recovery in tort. 32 
Another reason advanced in support· of the economic loss doc-
trine is that economic losses are the type of damages which have 
traditionally been covered by principles of contract and warranty 
27. UItramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
Justice Cardozo continued, "[tJhe hazards of a business conducted on these 
terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the 
implication of duty that exposes to these consequences." !d. 
28. Comment, Foreseeability of Third Party Economic Injuries-A Problem in 
Analysis, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 298 (1953). . 
29. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968). 
30. Kelly M. Hnatt, Comment, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery, 
73 IOWA L. REV. 1181, 1190-94 (1988). 
31. Indeed, when a defendant's conduct results in some type of physical harm, 
either to the plaintiff's person or property other than the product itself, the 
resulting loss is not "economic." See supra part III.A -B. There is considerable 
debate regarding whether damage to the product itself constitutes economic 
loss, which is generally not recoverable in negligence, and under what circum-
stances damage to property "other than the product itself" may constitute 
recoverable property damage. See supra part III.A-B. 
32. See, e.g., Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 420-21 (Ga. 1903) (denying recovery 
by commercial printer against contractor whose negligence caused downed 
power lines and resulted in loss of power to the plaintiff's presses); Brink v. 
Wabash R.R., 60 S.W. 1058, 1059-60 (Mo. 1901) (denying recovery against 
defendant who negligently derailed train which resulted in death of plaintiff's 
son, thereby preventing son from carrying out his contractual obligations to 
support plaintiff). 
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law, not tort law. Economic harm is typically incurred when a product 
or building fails to meet the expectations of the buyer, or when the 
only loss sustained is the cost of repair or replacement, the consequent 
loss of profits, or the diminution in value. 33 When the defect in a 
product or building structure is of such a qualitative nature, principles 
of contract and warranty law provide the appropriate remedy. 34 
Contract law protects expectancy interests and provides the appro-
priate set of rules when a purchaser wants a product to perform in 
a certain way, or expects the product to be of a particular quality 
or fit for a particular use. 35 In addition, contracts perform the 
important function of allocating risks among the parties, including 
the risk that profits will be lost if the product fails. Tort law, in 
contrast, imposes standards of reasonable care upon all persons to 
avoid causing foreseeable harm to the person or property of others.36 
Recovery of economic loss under tort principles, it is argued, would 
frustrate the risk-allocating function of contracts. 
Several leading cases have also applied the economic loss doctrine 
to deny recovery in tort for purely economic loss on the basis that 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) adequately provides for the 
recovery of such losses through express or implied warrantiesY The 
Supreme Court of Idaho, for instance, found no compelling reason 
to extend negligence principles "into an area in which the legislature 
[had) already enacted comprehensive legislation, thereby undermining 
that legislation. "38 The court reasoned that "the UCC provisions 
33. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 894-95. 
34. See generally Comment, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Purchasers for 
"Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 V. PA. L. REV. 539 
(1966); see also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 
F .2d 1165, 1172-73 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that buyer was not precluded from 
seeking tort recovery because damage to front-end loader constituted physical 
rather than economic injury); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 
N.E.2d 443, 451 (III. 1982) (holding that crack in grain storage tank constituted 
economic loss for which buyer could recover in contract only). . 
35. Barrett, supra note 12, at 901-02. 
36. [d. 
37. See, e.g., 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1186 (4th 
Cir. 1986); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 
F.2d 280, 288-91 (3d Cir. 1980); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 
151-52 (Cal. 1965); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784, 792-
94 (Idaho 1978); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 
447-48 (III. 1982) ("[I]t is preferable to relegate the consumer to the compre-
hensive scheme of remedies fashioned by the VCC, rather than requiring the 
consuming public to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can 
insure against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the 
business needs of some of his customers."); Nelson v. Todd's Ltd., 426 N.W.2d 
120, 125 (Iowa 1988). 
38. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784, 794 (Idaho 1978). 
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adequately define the rights of the parties in such cases and that 
judicial expansion of negligence law to cover purely economic losses 
would only add more confusion in an area already plagued with 
overlapping and conflicting theories of recovery. "39 
Other courts argue that permitting recovery of economic losses 
in tort would make it virtually impossible for a manufacturer to sell 
a product "as is."4O The VCC is based upon the principle that parties 
should be free to make contracts as they choose, including contracts 
that disclaim liability for breaches of warranty.41 Conversely, those 
courts that do not adhere to the economic loss rule have no difficulty 
reconciling the recovery of economic loss in negligence actions with 
the no-fault liability scheme of the UCC.42 These courts reason that 
a manufacturer should owe a duty of care to users of its products 
to prevent foreseeable harm, and that economic loss from defective 
products is "within the range of reasonable manufacturer fore-
sight. "43 
III. RECOVERY OF PVREL Y ECONOMIC LOSS IN 
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS AGAINST MANUFACTURERS 
In the area of manufacturing defects, an overwhelming majority 
of courts in the country have held that a purchaser of a defective 
39. [d. 
40. See, e.g., 2000 Watermark Ass'n, Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th 
Cir. 1986), in which the Fourth Circuit stated: 
The UCC is generally regarded as the exclusive source for ascertaining 
when the seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim is based 
on an intangible economic loss and not attributable to physical injury 
to person or to a tangible thing other than the defective product 
itsel f. [citation omitted) 1 f intangible economic loss were actionable 
under a tort theory, the UCC provisions permitting assignment of risk 
by means of warranties and disclaimers would be rendered meaning-
less. It would be virtually impossible for a seller to sell a product "as 
is" because if the product did not meet the economic expectations of 
the buyer, the buyer would have an action under tort law. The UCC 
represents a comprehensive statutory scheme which satisfies the needs 
of the world of commerce, and courts have been reluctant to extend 
judicial doctrines that might dislocate the legislative structure. 
[d. at 1186 (citation omitted). 
41. Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 668 (N.J. 
1985). "[T)he UCC is the more appropriate vehicle for resolving commercial 
disputes arising out of business transactions between persons in a distributive 
chain." [d. 
42. See, e.g., Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968); 
Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976). 
43. Western Seed, 442 P.2d at 218 (quoting Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds 
Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 
STAN. L. REV. 974, 989 (1966». 
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product may not recover purely economic losses in a negligence 
action· against a manufacturer. 44 These courts generally permit recov-
ery only for actual physical harm, either in the form of personal 
injury to the plaintiff or in the form of damage to "other property," 
that is, injury to property other than the product itself. 45 When injury 
is sustained by only the product itself, it is typically in the form of 
deterioration, internal breakdown, or some other failure of the 
product to meet the purchaser's expectations. 46 This type of damage 
is characterized as economic in nature47 and, it is argued, is more 
properly governed by contract or warranty law, rather than tort law 
principles. 48 
A. The Requirement oj Physical Damage to Property Other Than 
the Product Itself 
The requirement that physical damage be incurred to property 
other than the product itself has been adopted by most courts and 
has proven to be a significant barrier to recovery in tort. 49 In one 
44. For some of the leading cases denying recovery of purely economic losses in 
negligence actions, see 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 
(4th Cir. 1986); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 
1985); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 
280 (3d Cir. 1980); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 
(D. Ariz. 1975); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 217 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1975); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978); 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982); Alfred 
N. Koplin & Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 364 N.E.2d 100 (III. App. Ct. 1977) 
(denying recovery in negligence action against manufacturer for cost of repairing 
and replacing defective air conditioners); Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O. 
Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 625 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); National 
Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1983). 
45. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 894-97. 
46. See generally Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 
COLUM. L. REV. 917,918 (1966). 
47. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & 
Manufacturing Co., 384 S.E.2d 730 (S.C. 1989), stated that "[tlhe 'economic 
loss rule' simply states that there is no tort liability for a product defect if the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff is only to the product itself. In other words, 
tort liability only lies where the damage done is to other property or is personal 
injury." [d. at 734. 
48. See, e.g., 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 
1986); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 
1983); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 
1165, 1169-72 (3d Cir. 1981). 
49. See, e.g., R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that diminution in value of building and lost rent incurred 
as a result of negligent manufacture of glass panels were merely economic 
losses and not recoverable in tort); City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 
640 F. Supp. 559, 564 (D. S.c. 1986) (holding that manufacturer could be 
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of the most oft-cited cases, Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National 
Tank Co., 50 a plaintiff purchased a grain storage tank from the 
defendant who designed and manufactured the tanks. 51 When a crack 
developed in the tank because of a defect, the plaintiff brought suit 
in negligence and strict liability for the cost of repairs, and for loss 
of use of the tankY The Supreme Court of Illinois denied recovery 
against the manufacturer under both negligence and strict liability 
theories. 53 The court reasoned that the crack in the tank was not the 
type of "sudden and dangerous occurrence" that tort law was 
designed to protect. 54 Instead, the law of warranty afforded the 
plaintiff the proper measure of protection against commercial losses 
of this nature.55 The repair of the tank and the loss of its use were 
economic losses, and the plaintiff's only remedy lied in contract.56 
The distinction between damage that has occurred to "other 
property" and damage to the product itself is a difficult line to 
draw, and those courts attempting to do so are seldom consistent. 
In 2000 Watermark Ass'n. v. Celotex Corp. ,57 a homeowner's asso-
ciation sued the manufacturer of asphalt shingles in negligence when 
blisters appeared on the shingles, shortening their expected life. 58 The 
association argued that the removal of the defective shingles caused 
actual property damage, not mere economic loss, because the under-
liable in negligence for contamination of building caused by asbestos), a/I'd, 
827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 
902, 908 (D. Minn. 1985) (denying recovery against manufacturer of animal 
feed storage system for damage to feed on basis that feed was not "other 
property"); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 666 P.2d 
544, 547-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that plaintiff could not recover in 
negligence and strict liability against manufacturer of turbo-charger component 
of tractor for damage caused only to turbo-charger itself and engine; also 
holding for first time that when component part of product damages another 
component part, resulting harm may constitute damage to "other property," 
but not when damaged part was also provided by same vendor); Chrysler Corp. 
v. Taylor, 234 S.E.2d 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); Clark v. International Harvester 
Co., 581 P.2d 784 (Idaho 1978); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 
435 N.E.2d 443 (III. 1982); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. Steeple Jac 
Inc., 352 N. W .2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that defective gear 
box, which caused window washing unit to fall from plaintiff's building, was 
not actionable in negligence since there was no damage to persons or other 
property); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 209 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio 1965). 
50. 435 N .E.2d 443 (III. 1982). 
51. Id. at 445. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 451-52. 
54. Id. at 450. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986). 
58. Id. at 1185. 
1994) Economic Loss 531 
lying tar paper had also been damaged and needed to be replaced 
before new shingles could be installed. 59 Applying South Carolina 
law, the Fourth Circuit found that no property damage aside from 
the defective shingles had been incurred.60 According to the court, 
the expenses associated with replacement of the tar paper were only 
incidental in nature and would be recoverable only in a warranty 
action, not an action for negligence. 61 
In contrast, in Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-
Klein,62 the Supreme Court of Minnesota indicated that this type of 
incidental damage might give rise to recovery in negligence on the 
basis 'that damage was incurred by "other property. "63 The plaintiff 
in Parker-Klein brought suit in negligence and strict liability against 
the manufacturer of brick used in the construction of the exterior 
walls of two buildings.64 Shortly after construction, the brick proved 
defective and began to crack, craze, and spall. 65 The court found 
that the record did not support the plaintiff's claim that property 
apart from the brick itself was physically damaged, particularly since 
the brick was used for non-load-bearing walls and because the repairs 
to the buildings were completed without affecting their underlying 
structure.66 The court noted, however, that the failure of the brick 
had caused damage to the mortar between the bricks, and acknowl-
edged that this might constitute damage to "other property. "67 How-
ever, the plaintiff had not provided a breakdown of the cost to 
repair the mortar, and the court refused to allow the plaintiff to sue 
in tort for six million dollars solely by virtue of the relatively minor 
damages to the mortar. 68 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the "other 
property" requirement on only one occasion. In East River Steam-
. ship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 69 the plaintiff was a 
shipbuilder who had contracted with a turbine manufacturer to 
design, manufacture, and install turbines in four vessels.70 When the 
ships were put into service, the turbines in all four vessels malfunc-
59. [d. at 1187. 
60. [d. at 1187-88. 
61. [d. 
62. 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984), overruled by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 
N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). 
63. [d. at 820-21. 
64. [d. at 817. 
65. [d. at 818. 
66. [d. at 820. 
67. [d. at 820 n.4. 
68. [d. 
69. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
70. [d. at 859. 
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tioned. 7J The shipbuilder sued the manufacturer for the cost of 
repairing the turbines and for lost profits, alleging that the manu-
facturer was strictly liable for design defects and that it negligently 
supervised the installation of one of the turbines. 72 
The Court reviewed the majority and minority approaches to 
the issue of economic loss. The majority approach, according to the 
Court, holds that damage to a product itself is a purely monetary 
loss that is more properly covered by warranty law. 73 The minority 
view holds that a manufacturer's duty to produce a product that is 
not defective encompasses inj ury to the product itself. 74 Finding the 
minority view unpersuasive, the Court unanimously held that a 
manufacturer owes no duty under either a negligence or strict liability 
theory to prevent a product from damaging itself. 75 In this circum-
stance, when no person or other property is damaged, the resulting 
loss is purely economic and is best addressed by contractual reme-
dies. 76 
Only a few courts have found that economic loss, in the absence 
of any damage to either persons or other property, is recoverable in 
negligence actions. 77 These courts permit recovery regardless of whether 
the damage is only to the product itself, and irrespective of the 
manner in which the harm occurred. 78 Instead, these courts focus on 
the foreseeability of the resulting harm as the principal determinant 
of liability. 
In Berg v. General Motors Corp. ,79 the plaintiff was a commer-
cial fisherman who sued for lost profits incurred when the diesel 
boat engine manufactured by the defendant broke down due to an 
error in factory assembly. 80 The Supreme Court of Washington 
rejected the defendant's privity defense and its argument that the 
pecuniary losses suffered by the plaintiff were not recoverable in the 
absence of any property damage. 8J The court found that the negligent 
71. Id. at 860-61. 
72. Id. at 861. 
73. Id. at 868 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1965». 
74. [d. at 868-69 (citing Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 
1965». 
75. [d. at 871. 
76. [d. at 870-7 I. 
77. Western Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968); Nobility 
Homes v. Shivers, 557 S. W .2d 77 (Tex. 1977) (affirming judgment for plaintiff 
in negligence without discussion); Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d 818 
(Wash. 1976). 
78. See supra part lIl.A. 
79. 555 P.2d 818 (Wash. 1976), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72 et seq. 
(1993). 
80. [d. at 818-19. 
81. [d. at 822-23. 
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manufacture of the engine created the foreseeable risk that the 
plaintiff's enterprise would be halted and that lost profits would be 
incurred. 82 The court failed to recognize any "distinction that would 
allow recovery if the product in question destroyed the property of 
another, yet would deny recovery were the same product merely to 
disintegrate. "83 The requirement of personal injury or property dam-
age, the court reasoned, only inheres in strict liability actions.84 The 
court therefore concluded that "nothing in the tort of negligence ... 
prevents lost profits from being a specie of recompensable harm 
which is actionable against the remote manufacturer. "85 
The Supreme Court of Oregon has also allowed recovery for 
purely economjc loss. In State ex reI. Western Seed Production Corp. 
v. l.R. Campbell,86 the court held that sugar beet farmers could 
recover in negligence for crop losses caused by defects in seeds 
manufactured by the defendant. 87 The court acknowledged that other 
courts limited negligence liability for purely economic losses to situa-
tions in which the loss occurred "in a violent or dangerous acci-
dent."88 The court, however, saw no reason why the availability of 
a tort remedy should depend on whether the damage occurs ina 
traumatic fashion. 89 A manufacturer, it stated, should owe a duty to 
avoid foreseeable harm to the users of its product. 90 
B. The "Sudden and Calamitous" Exception 
In recent years, an intermediate form of the economic loss 
doctrine-or perhaps more accurately, an exception to it-has de-
veloped. This exception permits recovery in negligence or strict lia-
bility for injury to the product itself when the damage occurs in a 
sudden, calamitous, and dangerous manner.91 Rather than focus on 
82. [d. at 823. 
83. [d. at 822. 
84. [d. at 823. 
85. [d. Although the court failed to make such a distinction, this decision was 
decided under admiralty law, as were the decisions relied upon by the court. 
[d. 
86. 442 P.2d 215 (Or. 1968), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969). 
87. [d. at 218-19. 
88. [d. at 218. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. 
91. See, e.g., Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902, 908 n.4 (D. Minn. 
1985) (holding that damage to animal feed caused by defendant's feed storage 
system "was not caused by sudden calamitous occurrence, but was a rise of 
product ineffectiveness"); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 
(S.D. Ind. 1984), a/I'd, 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that economic 
loss may not be recovered in negligence action based on a sudden and calamitous 
occurrence); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977) (holding 
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whether damage has occurred to "other property," the exception 
focuses instead on the nature of the defect and the manner in which 
the damage occurred. 92 When the defect in the product results in 
deterioration, internal breakage, depreciation, or failure to live up 
to the purchaser's expectations, courts invoking this exception will 
permit recovery only under contract or warranty law. 93 However, 
where the damage results in a hazardous condition, through a sudden 
and calamitous occurrence, these same courts permit recovery under 
tort law.94 The "sudden and calamitous" exception, as one court 
observed, marks the distinction between "the disappointed users ... 
and the endangered ones. "95 
In Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor CO.,96 
one of the leading cases on this subject, the Third Circuit addressed 
whether, under Pennsylvania law, an accidental injury to a product 
itself as a result of a hazardous defect would constitute economic 
loss or physical property damage. 97 The plaintiff, in Caterpillar, had. 
purchased a front-end tractor loader from the defendant manufac-
turer and used it without incident for four years.98 While the loader 
was in operation, a fire suddenly broke out and the machine was 
severely damaged. 99 The court stated: 
In cases such as the present one where only the defective 
product is damaged, the majority approach is to identify 
whether a particular injury amounts to economic loss or 
physical damage. In drawing this distinction, the items for 
that damage to trailer from fire caused by the ignition of polyurethane padding 
in carpet of trailer was "sudden and calamitous" damage and not deterioration, 
internal breakage, or depreciation that would be considered economic loss); 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450 (III. 1982) 
(holding that crack that developed in grain storage tank was not sudden and 
dangerous occurrence, but rather "a qualitative defect relating to the purchas-
er's expectation in terms of the product's fitness to perform its intended 
function"); Industrial Uniform Rental Co. v. International Harvester Co., 463 
A.2d 1085 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); see also Barrett, supra note 12, at 914-16; 
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 
917, 918 (1966). 
92. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 
(3d Cir. 1981); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind. 
1984), aiI'd, 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985). 
93. Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 
N.W.2d 816,821 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Panquin Farms, 
458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). 
94. [d. at 821. 
95. Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Or. 1978). 
96. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981). 
97. [d. at 1166-67. 
98. ld. at 1166. 
99. [d. 
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which damages are sought, such as repair costs, are not 
determinative. Rather, the line between tort and contract 
must be drawn by analyzing interrelated factors such as the 
nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in 
which the injury arose. IOO 
535 
Applying these factors, the Third Circuit found that the nature of 
the risk, a fire, was a "sudden and highly dangerous occurrence," 101 
and that the alleged defect, a faulty design in the hydraulic line, 
constituted "a safety hazard that posed a serious risk of harm to 
person and property." 102 The court therefore held that under Penn-
sylvania law, damages incurred to the product itself would not be 
treated as an economic loss when the injury stemmed from a haz-
ardous defect and was brought about by a sudden and highly 
dangerous occurrence. 103 
Several courts appear to have adopted a variation of the sudden 
and calamitous exception that permits recovery in tort for damage 
to the product itself, but only where the damage takes place in a 
manner that creates an identifiable risk of injury to persons or other 
property.l04 Stated otherwise, sudden, violent damage to the product 
itself would be insufficient to permit recovery in tort if the product 
posed no threat to anything or anyone other than the product itself. 
For example, in Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v. Caterpillar 
Tractor CO.,105 the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of an electric 
generator when the oil pressure valve of the generator failed to 
function, causing severe damage to the engine. 106 Although the dam-
age occurred in a sudden manner, no persons or other property were 
harmed.107 The court therefore denied the plaintiff's tort claim. lOS 
100. Id. (emphasis added). As another court has noted: 
Deciding whether there was a violent occurrence does not depend on 
the nature of the product. It depends on the nature of the .incident 
that caused the damage .... [E)xploding bottles, runaway barges, 
flying saw blades, and incendiary packages [are the) types of accidents 
that are likely to cause bodily injuries or damage to other products 
that are traditionally recoverable in tort. 
City of Clayton v. Grumman Energy Prods., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1122, 1126 
(E.D. Mo. 1983). 
101. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F .2d 1165, 
1174 (3d Cir. 1981). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1175. 
104. See, e.g., Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 
324 (Alaska 1981); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Russell 
v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d. 1383 (Or. 1978). 
105. 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981). 
106. Id. at 326. 
107. Id. at 329. 
108. Id. at 330. 
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The United States Supreme Court has altogether rejected the 
"sudden and calamitous" exception in East River Steamship Corp. 
v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 109 The petitioner in East River filed an 
admiralty complaint against Transamerica, alleging that it was strictly 
liable for certain design defects in turbines installed in the petitioner's 
vessels .. 10 In examining whether the remedy for damages to the 
turbines properly lied in a tort action, the Court observed that even 
where the harm to the product occurs through an abrupt,accident-
like event, "the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, 
and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser 1.0 receive 
the benefit of its bargain-traditionally the core concern of contract 
law." III The "maintenance of product value and quality is precisely 
the purpose of express and implied warranties."112 The concern for 
personal safety evidence by tort law is reduced or not implicated 
when the injury is only to the product itself. 113 
C. A Manufacturer's Liability Under Maryland Law for 
Economic Loss 
Maryland's appellate courts have recently adopted a novel ap-
proach to the recovery of economic loss in the context of a products 
liability action. Applying the "risk of harm" analysis first set forth 
in the Atlantis decision, the court of appeals in A.J. Decoster v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp.114 and the court of special appeals in 
109. 476 V.S. 858 (1986). 
110. [d. at 861. 
Ill. [d. at 870. Deans Prosser and Keeton have observed: 
Making liability depend upon whether or not the loss results from an 
"accident" creates a difficult issue and arguably an irrelevant issue 
with respect to the validity of contract provisions allocating the risk 
of loss for harm to the defective product itself to the purchaser. 
Distinguishing "accidental" damage to the product from mere eco-
nomic loss is difficult in many cases. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 101(3), at 709. 
112. East River, 476 V.S. at 872. 
113. [d. at 871-72. Dean Keeton appears 'to agree with the Supreme Court. He has 
stated: 
A distinction should be made between the type of "dangerous con-
dition" that causes damage only to the product itself and the type 
that is dangerous to other property or persons. A hazardous product 
that has harmed something or someone can be labeled a part of the 
accident problem; tort law seeks to protect against this type of harm 
through allocation of risk. In contrast, a damaging event that harms 
only the product should be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations 
directing liability placement in tort. Consequently, if a defect causes 
damage limited solely to the property, recovery should be available if 
at all on a contract-warranty theory. 
W. Page Keeton, Annual Survey 0/ Texas Law on Torts, 32 Sw. L.l. 1 (1978). 
114. 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330 (1994). 
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Morris v. Osmose Wood PreservingllS have held that a plaintiff may 
recover under a negligence theory for purely economic losses, includ-
ing harm to the product itself, if the defect in the product causes a 
dangerous condition creating a risk of death or personal injury to 
the consumer. 116 Although the courts in A.J. Decoster and Morris 
did not ultimately award economic losses to the plaintiffs, the deci-
sions mark an important turning point in Maryland law in the 
products liability area. 
In A.J. Decoster, the court of appeals addressed for the first 
time in the products liability setting, the "distinction between prop-
erty loss and pure economic loss in determining whether a claim may 
be brought under a tort or contract theory or both." 117 The plaintiff 
in the suit was a commercial chicken and egg producer who purchased 
an electrical transfer switch designed to detect and respond to any 
loss of electrical power in the ventilation system at its chicken 
houses.1I8 When a power failure occurred, the switch did not sense 
the loss of power and failed to activate the backup power system. 119 
As a result, the plaintiff's ventilation system overheated and shut 
down, suffocating over 140,000 chickens. 12o The plaintiff filed suit 
against Westinghouse, the manufacturer of the switch, alleging counts 
of negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty.121 Westinghouse 
sought to dismiss the negligence claim on the basis that the plaintiff 
had alleged only economic losses.1 22 
The court of appeals framed the issue in A.J. Decoster as 
whether the plaintiff's damages could be considered "physical harm 
or economic losses and, if the latter, whether the defective switch 
caused a dangerous condition creating a risk of death or personal 
injury to humans. "123 The court did not reach the second part of 
this determination because it found that the death of the plaintiff's 
chickens was a loss of physical property, rather than an economic 
loss, and was therefore recoverable. 124 The ~ourt reasoned that the 
plaintiff was not seeking to recover the loss of the value of the 
115. 99 Md. App. 646, 639 A.2d 147, cert. granted, 336 Md. 98,646 A.2d 1018 
(1994). 
116. A.J. Decoster, 333 Md. at 251-53, 634 A.2d at 1333-34; Morris, 99 Md. App. 
at 654-55, 639 A.2d at 151-52. 
117. 333 Md. at 247, 634 A.2d at 1331. 
118. [d. The plaintiff originally alleged that it purchased the switch from Westing-
house, the manufacturer, but later conceded that it purchased the switch from 
a dealer. [d. at 248 n.l, 634 A.2d at 1331 n.1. 
119. [d. at 247, 634 A.2d at 1331. 
120. [d. at 247-48, 634 A.2d at 1331. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. at 248-49, 634 A.2d at 1331-32. 
123. [d. at 251, 634 A.2d at 1333. 
124. [d. 
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switch, the costs to repair or replace the switch, or any lost profits 
from the plaintiff's diminished egg production. 125 Rather, the plaintiff 
sought the replacement value of the chickens, which constituted 
property that was "wholly distinct from the allegedly defective prod-
uct." 126 The court held that a manufacturer may be held liable for 
physical harm to person or property, other than the product itself, 
caused by defects in its products "because it is charged with the 
responsibility to ensure that its products meet a standard of safety 
creating no unreasonable risk of harm." 127 
The court of special appeals was faced with a more challenging 
situation in Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving,128 where there was 
no damage to "other property." The plaintiffs in Morris were a 
group of homeowners who alleged that the fire retardant treated 
(FRT) plywood used to construct the roofs of their townhomes had 
deteriorated, resulting in impairment of the strength and structural 
integrity of the roofs.129 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of the 
FRT plywood under negligence and strict liability theories, seeking 
damages for the expenses of inspecting, repairing, and replacing the 
roofs. 130 Invoking Atlantis, the plaintiffs contended that the condition 
of the roofs created a risk of personal injury since injury could result 
from walking on the roofs or from a collapse of the roofs, although 
no personal injuries had yet occurred. 131 
125. [d. at 252, 634 A.2d at 1333. 
126. [d. at 253, 634 A.2d at 1334. The only other reported decision in Maryland 
·in which there was damage to "other property" is Worm v. American Cyanamid 
Co., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 2d (Callaghan) 441 (D. Md. 1992), a/I'd, 5 F.3d 
774 (4th Cir. 1993). In Worm, three commercial farmers sued the manufacturer 
of "Scepter," a herbicide, for damages sustained to their corn crop. [d. at 
441. The farmers had used the herbicide successfully in a prior harvest of 
soybeans. [d. After the soybean harvest, the farmers planted corn on 74 acres 
of land that had previously been treated with Scepter. [d. When the corn crop 
failed to meet commercial standards for sale, the farmers sued the manufacturer 
for negligently failing to test Scepter and negligently failing to properly for· 
mulate and manufacture the product. [d. at 442. 
Applying Maryland law, the district court acknowledged that the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland had not definitively resolved the issue, first broached in 
Atlantis and Jacques, whether, in the absence of privity, Maryland recognizes 
negligence actions when no personal injury damages are claimed. [d. The 
district court refused to "needlessly anticipate the development of state tort 
law," and concluded that, whatever the result of this inquiry, the plaintiff 
farmers had not generated sufficient issues of fact to withstand the manufac· 
turer's motion for summary judgment. [d. 
127. A.J. Decoster, 333 Md. at 250-51,634 A.2d at 1332. 
128. 99 Md. App. 646, 639 A.2d 147, cert. granted, 336 Md. 98, 646 A.2d 1018 
(1994). 
129. [d. at 650, 639 A.2d at 150. 
130. [d. 
131. [d. at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152. 
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The court was quick to distinguish the plaintiffs' damages from 
those alleged in A tlantis, noting that "this is not a case where a 
sudden fire could reasonably be calculated to result in serious physical 
injury or death in addition to property damage." 132 Rather, the court 
found that the damage to the roofs was qualitative in nature because 
it occurred through gradual deterioration of the plywood.133 The 
plaintiffs alleged only that the plywood had "darkened, spotted, 
warped and fractured." 134 Thus, the court found that the damage to 
the FR T plywood fell short of creating a clear danger of death or 
personal injury.135 The court upheld the lower court's dismissal of 
the plaintiffs' negligence count on the basis that they had alleged in 
merely "conclusory terms" that someone could be hurt if they were 
walking on the roof, or if a heavy snowfall occurred triggering a 
collapse .1 36 "Mere possibilities," the court held, "do not meet the 
threshold of establishing a clear danger of death or personal in-
jury. "137 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
applied Atlantis in one decision, but denied recovery against the 
defendant manufacturer because its defective product had not pre-
sented a risk of personal injury to the purchaser of the product or 
others. In In re Lone Star Industries, Inc., Concrete Railroad Cross 
Ties Litigation, 138 the district court found that premature cracking 
and deterioration of concrete railroad ties purchased by the plaintiff, 
Amtrak, did not pose a "clear danger of death or personal injury."139 
By the plaintiff's own admission, only 6.80/0 of the ties had lost 
some of their load bearing capacity and n"eeded to be replaced. l40 
The court found that the danger of the ties failing and causing a 
derailment or other calamitous event was "merely speculative at best 
132. [d. at 655, 639 A.2d at 152. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. The plaintiffs had owned their townhouses for six to ten years and had 
yet to replace the roofs for fear of personal injury. [d. at 655, 639 A.2d at 
152. 
136. [d. at 655, 639 A.2d at 152. 
137. [d. at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152. One inevitable result of the Atlantis decision 
has beel} that in support of their negligence claims, plaintiffs typically allege 
in their complaint as a matter of course that the defendant's negligence created 
a risk of personal injury. The court's holding in Morris indicates that it will 
not involve itself in the business of rubber stamping complaints and denying 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment merely because a 
plaintiff has perfunctorily alleged in the complaint that a risk of personal 
injury exists. 
138. 776 F. Supp. 206 (D. Md. 1991). 
139. [d. at 222. 
140. [d. 
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and [was] not the type of circumstance which would support the 
assertion of a tort claim."141 
Prior to these decisions, the Maryland courts had never before 
applied the "risk of harm" approach in a products liability suit. The 
few decisions by the state's courts that addressed the economic loss 
doctrine generally followed the majority approach in the country-
permitting recovery under a negligence theory only where the harm 
resulting from a defective product was in the form of personal injury 
or damage to "other property." 142 Whenever injury to the product 
itself was incurred, such as qualitative defects in the product or 
losses that were purely pecuniary in nature, Maryland courts invari-
ably denied recovery in tort by a third party.143 For example, in 
Excavation Construction, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 144 a construction 
company sued the manufacturer of defective dump trucks in negli-
gence and for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 145 
The plaintiff claimed as damages the financial losses incurred when 
the trucks were idle for a period of time .146 The district court held 
that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the negli-
gence count, finding that the Maryland courts would not extend a 
manufacturer's liability to that type of economic injury. 147 
Interestingly, the court indicated that it would recognize a dis-
tinction between two types of harm that may occur "to the product 
itself"-physical damage to the product and pecuniary loss without 
physical harm to the product. 148 The court quoted with approval an 
oft-cited passage from Dean Prosser: 
There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence 
covers any kind of physical harm, including not only per-
sonal injuries, but also property damage to the defective 
chattel itself, ... as well as damage to other property in 
the vicinity. But where there is no accident, and no physical 
damage, and the only loss is a pecuniary one, through the 
141. Id. at 223. 
142. See, e.g., Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 20 U.CC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 
441 (D. Md. 1992), a/i'd, 5 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1993) (granting defendant 
manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on tort claims brought for 
damages to "other property"). 
143. See In re Lone Star Indus., Inc., Concrete R.R. Cross Ties Litig., 776 F. 
Supp. 206 (D. Md. 1991); Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 
641 (D. Md. 1986); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. V. Toshiba Corp., 
576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983); Excavation Constr., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, 
Inc., 31 U.CC. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md. 1981). 
144. 31 U.CC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md. 1981). 
145. Id. at 1387. 
146. [d. 
147. Id. at 1391-92. 
148. Id. at 1390-91. 
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loss of the value or use of the thing sold, or the cost of 
repairing it, the courts have adhered to the rule ... that 
purely economic interests are not entitled to protection 
against mere negligence, and so have denied recovery. 149 
541 
Thus, the court implied that it would hold a manufacturer liable in 
negligence if there was harm to the product that was physical in 
nature, but would not hold the manufacturer liable if the plaintiff 
suffered purely pecuniary losses .150 The plaintiff in Excavation Con-
struction was clearly seeking damages from this latter category by 
bringing suit for lost profits incurred as a result of the idle truckS.ISI 
Though the decision does not describe the nature of the "defect" 
afflicting the trucks, the court apparently concluded that no physical 
damage had occurred to the trucks themselves. 
In addition to purely pecuniary losses, the district court has also 
held that qualitative defects in a product, such as those incurred in 
Morris, are not recoverable in a negligence action against a manu-
facturer. In Wood Products, Inc. v. eMI Corp.,m the plaintiff had 
purchased a wood furnace from the defendant manufacturer for use 
in its milling business. 153 Shortly after the furnace was installed, 
problems developed as a result of defects in its design and manufac-
ture. IS4 The evidence presented to the court revealed that the drum 
of the furnace was "too thin" and "too flexible"; the air distribution 
tubes "sagged and failed"; the seals of the furnace "were of a lesser 
quality than had been promised"; only one of several thermocouplers 
"ever worked satisfactorily"; and temperatures within the furnace 
"were frequently excessive." 155 The furnace simply "never [had] and 
149. Id. at 1391 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 101, at 665) (emphasis 
added). In the fifth edition of his treatise, Prosser takes a decidedly different 
view of when damage to the property itself is recompensable: 
Making liability depend upon whether or not the loss results from an 
"accident" creates a difficult issue and arguably an irrelevant issue 
with respect to the validity of contract provisions allocating the risk 
of loss for harm to the defective product itself to the purchaser. 
Distinguishing "accidental" damage to the product from mere eco-
nomic loss is difficult in many cases. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 101(3), at 709. 
150. In the passage quoted by the court, Dean Prosser indicates that some "accident" 
to the chattel is required in a negligence action against the manufacturer. 
Whether this is a reference to the "sudden and calamitous" exception is 
unclear. Arguably, any type of physical harm to a product is an accident, even 
where it does not occur in a sudden and calamitous manner. 
151. Excavation Construction, 31 V.C.C. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) at 1387. 
152. 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986). 
153. Id. at 644. 
154. Id. at 646. 
155. Id. 
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never [would] work."156 The court stated that it "doubt[ed] that the 
furnace could ever hav~ functioned for its intended purpose."157 The 
court dismissed the plaintiff's negligence claim against the manufac-
turer on the ground that the plaintiff alleged only damages for 
economic loss,158 although it failed to discuss why the harm to the 
furnace was characterized as such. It is apparent, however, that the 
defects and deficiencies in the furnace were of a qualitative nature, 
rather than the result of physical harm to property-either "other 
property" or the product itself. Warranty law therefore provided the 
appropriate remedy. 
Thus, Morris, Excavation Construction, and Wood Products 
indicate that there are two instances under Maryland law in which a 
plaintiff may not recover economic losses in a negligence action: (1) 
when purely pecuniary harm has been incurred, or (2) when the 
damage to the product is merely qualitative in nature and not in the 
form of actual physical harm. When the harm incurred to the product 
falls into either category, the policy reasons supporting the application 
of the economic loss doctrine are perhaps at their strongest. 1S9 The 
risk that a purchaser of a product might sustain purely pecuniary 
injury, such as lost profits, is a risk that typically is, or should be, 
assumed by a contract between the parties. Likewise, qualitative 
deficiencies in a product, such as those incurred in Wood Products 
and Morris, are the type of harm that statutory warranties are 
designed to remedy. A manufacturer, it is argued, "does not assume 
responsibility for the commercial viability or economic performance 
of the item sold. "160 As the court of appeals stated in A. J. Decoster: 
The distinction between tort recovery for physical injury 
and warranty recovery for economic loss derives from policy 
considerations which allocate the risks related to a defective 
product between the seller' and the purchaser. A manufac-
turer may be held liable for physical injuries, including harm 
to property, caused by defects in its products because it is 
charged with the responsibility of ensuring that its products 
meet a standard of safety creating no unreasonable risk of 
harm. However, where the loss is purely economic, the 
manufacturer cannot be charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring that the product meet the particular expectations 
of the consumer unless it is aware of those expectations and 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
15S. Id. at 64S. 
159. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text. 
160. Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P.2d SIS, SI9 (Wash. 1976), superseded 
by WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72 et seq. (1993). 
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has agreed that the product will meet them. Thus, generally, 
the only recovery for a purely economic loss would be under 
a contract theory.161 
543 
D. Recovery of Economic Loss Against Manufacturers Under 
Other Causes of Action-Strict Liability, Negligent 
Misrepresentation, and Breach of Express and Implied Warranties l62 
Alternative theories under which a plaintiff' might attempt to 
recover economic losses against a manufacturer in the absence of 
privity include strict liability, negligent misrepresentation, and breach 
of warranty. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has indicated 
that these theories are not duplicative and, therefore, may be brought 
as independent, parallel bases of recovery. 163 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Phipps v. General Motors 
Corp.,I64 adopted the theory of strict liability set forth in section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which expressly rejects 
the privity requirement when a party sues a manufacturer in strict 
liability.165 Section 402A provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
161. 333 Md. 245,250-51,634 A.2d 1330, 1332-33 (1994). 
162. This Comment provides only cursory coverage of the economic loss rule under 
causes of action other than negligence. 
163. Dechello v. Johnson Enters., 74 Md. App. 228, 235 n.4, 536 A.2d 1203, 1207 
n.4, cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 A.2d 964 (1988); Valk Mfg. Co. v. 
Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304,310, 537 A.2d 622, 625 (1988), rev'd en bane, 
Montgomery City v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 562 A.2d 1246 (1989). 
164. 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976). In Phipps, Judge Eldridge 
explained the following reasons for imposing strict liability on manufacturers: 
(I) manufacturers are better able financially to bear the risk of loss, (2) 
consumers rely on manufacturers in expecting that the products they purchase 
will be safe for their intended purposes, and that this expectation is better met 
by strict liability than negligence, and (3) the requirement that the defect in a 
product render it unreasonably dangerous is a sufficient showing of fault to 
warrant imposing liability. [d. at 343, 363 A.2d at 958. 
165. For a plaintiff to recover under strict liability, it must be established that: (I) 
the product was in defective condition at the time it left the possession or 
control of the' seller, (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer, (3) the defect in the product was the cause of the plaintiff's 
injuries, and (4) the product was expected to and did reach the consumer 
without substantial change in its condition. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 
Md. 124, 134, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985) (citing Phipps v. General Motors 
Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976»; Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 
303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348 (1985); Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 50 Md. App. 
614, 440 A.2d 1085 (1982), a/I'd, 295 Md. 285, 455 A.2d 434 (1983). 
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caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, 
if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such 
a p"roduct, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product 
from or entered into any contractual relation with the 
seller. 166 
Section 402A(2)(b) grants the right of recovery to both the 
"user"167 and "consumer"168 of a product, despite their lack of 
privity because neither person purchased the product directly from 
the manufacturer. In fact, the court of special appeals has deter-
mined that the scope of liability under the terms "user" and "con-
sumer" extends to even mere "bystanders." 169 
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) (emphasis added). The Mar-
yland courts have also adopted the theory, similar to that set forth in § 402A, 
that "privity is not required to maintain a suit against a manufacturer or seller 
for an injury sustained in the use of a chattel which is likely to be dangerous 
jar the use jar which it was supplied." Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., 
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709,716-17 (D. Md. 1971) (emphasis added). This theory 
is set forth in § 388 of the Restatement, which provides as follows: 
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for 
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should 
expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be 
endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use 
of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose 
use it is supplied, if the supplier 
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is likely to be 
dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and 
(b) has reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is 
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dan-
gerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1964); see also Excavation Constr., 
Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 31 U.CC Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md. 
1981); Babylon V. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958); Kaplan V. Stein, 
198 Md. 414, 84 A.2d 81 (1951). 
167. A "user" is defined in comment 1 as a person who passively enjoys the benefit 
of the product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. 1 (1964). 
168. A "consumer" is defined as one who purchases a product or who is a member 
of the family of the final pu"rchaser, his employee, his guest, or a donee of 
the purchaser. [d. 
169. Va1k Mfg. CO. V. Rangaswamy, 74 Md. App. 304, 323, 537 A.2d 622, 627 
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In Phipps, the court of appeals applied the strict liability theory 
in a case involving personal injuries caused by a defective product. 170 
The court held that the plaintiff, who was injured when the car he 
was driving suddenly accelerated and crashed into a tree, had stated 
a cause of action under section 402A against the manufacturer of 
the car despite the lack of privi ty. 171 
The Maryland courts have not applied section 402A to allow a 
plaintiff to recover purely economic loss in the form of either 
pecuniary losses or qualitative defects in a product. In those few 
decisions that have addressed the issue, the courts have held that 
such claims cannot be brought under either a strict liability or a 
negligence theory.172 In A.1. Decoster, however, application of sec-
tion 402A was extended for the first time to damage other than 
personal injury. 173 The plaintiff in A.1. Decoster, in addition to a 
negligence claim, also brought a strict liability claim for the death 
of its chickens, which the court characterized as damage to "other 
property." 174 In its motion to dismiss the strict liability count, the 
defendant argued that the legislature's enactment of warranty reme-
dies under the vee created a comprehensive scheme of recovery for 
economic losses that preempted the field' of products liability. 175 
Relying on Phipps and a literal reading Of section 402A,176 the court 
(1988), rev'd en bane, Montgomery City v. Valk Mfg. Co., 317 Md. 185, 562 
A.2d 1246 (1989). Most other jurisdictions in the country provide relief to 
bystanders under § 402A. Id. at 322-33, 537 A.2d at 629-32. 
170. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 307, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976). 
171. Id. 
172. In re Lone Star Indus., Inc., Concrete R.R. Cross Ties Litig., 776 F. Supp. 
206, 221-22 (D. Md. 1991) (characterizing deterioration damage to railroad ties 
as economic loss and denying recovery of such loss in negligence and strict 
liability action against the manufacturer of ties); Copiers Typewriters Calcu-
lators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 325-26 (D. Md. 1983) (denying 
recovery of economic losses in both strict liability and negligence, without 
distinguishing the two theories). 
The United States Supreme Court has likewise held that a products liability 
claim, whether based on a theory of negligence or strict liability, cannot be 
asserted when the only.injury claimed is purely economic loss. East River S.S. 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). See supra parts 
lILA-B. This is generally the approach taken by most states in the country. 
For a discussion of this approach and the minority approach, which holds that 
purely economic losses are recoverable in strict liability, see Joe E. Manuel & 
Gregory B. Richards, Economic Loss in Strict Liability-Beyond the Realm oj 
402A, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (1986). 
173. 333 Md. 245, 258, 634 A.2d 1330, 1336 (1994). 
174. Id. at 253, 634 A.2d at 1332. 
175. Id. at 255, 634 A.2d at 1334-35. 
176. The court noted that § 402A(I) describes the applicable seller as "[o]ne who 
sells any product in, a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property" and further provides that a seller is liable for 
"physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or his 
property." Id. at 258, 634 A.2d at 1336. 
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of appeals rejected the defendant's preemption argument and held 
that "[i]t is beyond question that § 402A applies not only to acci-
dental injuries to consumers or users of a product, but also to injury 
to the property of the user or consumer." 177 The court based its 
holding primarily on equitable principles, reasoning that fairness 
required recovery for injuries to person and property resulting from 
unreasonably dangerous conditions. 178 A consumer, the court stated, 
does not simply lose the benefit of his bargain when a product proves 
defective, but rather sustains damage to other property because the 
defect is so dangerous in nature. 179 The court concluded that a 
consumer does not "bargain[] for destruction of his property any 
more than he should be considered to have bargained for physical 
injury to himself or others."18o 
In negligent misrepresentation actions,181 the Maryland courts 
have permitted recovery of economic losses only in certain in-
stances. 182 The courts have, for example, allowed (l) a plaintiff to 
recover against a mortgage broker for economic losses incurred in 
relying on the broker's advice;183 (2) a prospective homeowner to 
recover against a developer for a grossly inaccurate estimate of water 
and sewer connection charges;184 and (3) a plaintiff to recover for 
overpayment of a stock purchase as a result of a brokerage's negligent 
misrepresentations. 18s The. courts have not, however, permitted the 
recovery of purely economic losses in a products liability setting 
177. [d. 
178. [d. at 259, 634 A.2d at 1337. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. at 259-60, 634 A.2d at 1337. 
181. The elements of negligent misrepresentation are as follows: 
(I) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently 
asserts a false statement; 
(2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the 
plaintiff; 
(3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely 
on the statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury; 
(4) the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; 
and 
(5) the plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's 
negligence. 
Weisman v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 444, 540 A.2d 783, 791 (1988) (citing 
Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 337, 439 A.2d 534, 539 (1982». 
182. See, e.g., St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 
192,278 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Brack v. Evans, 230 Md. 
548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963); Ward Dev. Co. v. Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645, 493 
A.2d 421 (1985). 
183. See St. Paul, 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12. 
184. See Ingrao, 63 Md. App. 645, 493 A.2d 421. 
185. See Brack, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880. 
1994] Economic Loss 547 
based on a negligent misrepresentation theory. 186 Generally, the courts 
reason th<l;t Maryland's "pervasive statutory scheme" governing war-
ranty claims adequately· protects plaintiffs against economic losses 
caused by the misrepresentations of a seller or manufacturer regarding 
their products. 18? 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed the appli-
cability of the economic loss doctrine in a negligent misrepresentation 
action in Boatel Industries, Inc. v. Hester. 188 The plaintiffs in Boatel 
Industries purchased a yacht which proved to have a cracked hull 
and other design and structural defects rendering it unseaworthy. 189 
They brought suit against the manufacturer of the yacht for breach 
of warranty and negligent misrepresentations allegedly made by the 
manufacturer concerning the construction and seaworthiness of the 
yacht. 190 The court of special appeals found that the unseaworthy 
and unsafe condition of the yacht created "a risk of death or personal 
injury" to plaintiffs. 191 Citing Atlantis, 192 the court noted that because 
the plaintiffs had not incurred physical injuries, their damages were 
entirely economic in nature. 193 Further, the court noted that under 
Atlantis a claimant need not wait for personal injury to occur before 
bringing a negligence action. 194 Nevertheless, the court refused to 
extend Atlantis to cases of negligent misrepresentation. 195 The court 
reasoned that the damages recoverable for negligent misrepresenta-
tion-the reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition"":"'are 
"included within the damages recoverable under the warranty 
counts. "196 
186. Flow Indus., Inc. v. Fields Constr. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1988); 
Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986); Copiers 
Typewriters Calculators v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983); 
Boatel Indus. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 550 A.2d 389 (1988). 
187. Wood Prods., 651 F. Supp. at 648. 
188. 77 Md. App. 284, 550 A.2d 389 (1988). 
189. [d. Other problems plaguing the vessel included engine and generator mal-
functions, air conditioning and heating problems, and an excessive fuel con-
sumption rate. [d. at 293, 550 A.2d at 394. 
190. [d. at 307, 550 A.2d at 397·98. 
191. [d. at 308, 550 A.2d at 401. 
192. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986). 
193. Boatel, 77 Md. App. at 307, 550 A.2d at 401. The court implied that in 
products liability cases, personal injury is a necessary element of a cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation. [d. (citing Weisman v. Connors, 312 
Md. 428, 540 A.2d 783 (1988». 
194. [d. 
195. [d. 
196. [d.; see also Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641, 648 (D. 
Md. 1986) (denying plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim against man-
ufacturer for false statements regarding capabilities of and improvements to 
wood furnace, on basis that "[a) pervasive statutory scheme governs warranty 
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In claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, 
the privity requirement has been expressly abolished by the Maryland 
General Assembly.197 Protection under this warranty extends not only 
to a party who purchases the product for resale to a consumer, but 
also to the ultimate consumer. 198 The plaintiff who brings an action 
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability may recover 
economic losses as "incidental" or "consequential" damages under 
section 2-715 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code.l99 
In claims for either breach of the express warranty or breach of 
the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the privity 
requirement has also been expressly eliminated, but only when the 
claims in product liability cases, and it appears inappropriate to extend theories 
of negligent misrepresentation into an area where the General Assembly has 
carefully determined who may assert what claims against whom"). 
197. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-314(l)(a)-(b) (1976). Subsections (a) and (b) 
of § 2-314(1) provide as follows: 
(a) In §§ 2-314 through 2-318 of this title, "seller" includes the 
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or 
retailer; and 
(b) Any previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the 
buyer and seller in any action brought by the buyer. 
[d.; see Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 
312, 322-23 (D. Md. 1983). Maryland is one of only a few states which has 
altered the Uniform Commercial Code to expressly abolish the privity require-
ment. THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY 
AND LAW DfGEST 2-229 (2d ed. 1991). 
198. Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), a/I'd, 
273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d I (1975); Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television 
Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970). 
199. Section 2-715 provides: 
(I) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include ex-
penses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and 
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially rea-
sonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting 
cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other 
breach. 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
(a) Any loss resulting from the general or particular requirements 
and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason 
to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover 
or otherwise; and 
(b) Injury to person or property proximately resulting from any 
breach of warranty. 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-715 (1992). 
For example, in Excavation Construction, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 311 
U.C.C. Rep. Servo (Callaghan) 1386 (D. Md. 1981), the court held that 
economic losses, in the form of lost profits incurred by the plaintiff while its 
trucks were idle, were consequential damages within the meaning of § 2-715(2). 
[d. at 1388. 
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plaintiff has suffered personal injury. 200 When only economic loss is 
incurred, privity is required in an action brought pursuant to either 
of these theories. 201 
As Boatel Industries indicates, a plaintiff is most likely to recover 
economic losses in a breach of warranty action brought under Mar-
yland's Commercial Law Article.202 There are obvious advantages to 
bringing a breach of warranty claim, the most significant of which 
is that a plaintiff may recover without proving negligence on the 
part of the manufacturer or seller.203 The plaintiff need only dem-
onstrate the existence of the warranty, a breach of that warranty, 
and that the breach was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. 204 
Any knowledge of the defect by the manufacturer or seller, or any 
lack of care, is irrelevant. 20S 
200. Section 2-318 of the Commercial Law Article extends a seller's warranties, 
whether express or implied, 
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer 
or who is a guest in his home or any other ultimate consumer or user 
of the goods or person affected thereby if it is reasonable to expect 
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and 
who is injured in person by breach- of the warranty. 
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-318 (1992) (emphasis added). 
201. See Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641, 649 (D. Md. 1986). 
In Wood Products, the court found that there was privity between the buyer 
of the defective furnace and the furnace manufacturer, and that the buyer 
could therefore recover economic losses on a breach of implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose theory. [d. Interestingly, the court also found 
that even assuming that the parties were not in privity, the manufacturer would 
still be liable on the warranty claim since it "played a significant role in the 
sale of the furnace ... [and) actively solicited and dominated the negotiations." 
Id. The court held that the manufacturer was estopped from denying that it 
was in privity with the buyer. [d. at 649-50 (citing Addressograph-Multigraph 
Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28 (1974». 
202. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-313 et seq. (1992). 
203. See Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), 
afl'd, 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975). 
204. Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297,299 (D. Md. 1980); 
Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md. 
App. 452, 463, 339 A.2d 302, 309 (1975); Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 
Md. App. 611,621, 318 A.2d 874, 880 (1974), aff'd, 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 
I (1975). In the context of construction defects see Starfish Condominium 
Ass'n v. York ridge Service Corp., 295 Md. 693, 710,458 A.2d 805, 814 (1983). 
205. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 300, 336 A.2d 118, 126 (1975), 
rev'd on other grounds, 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976). As the comment 
to § 2·314 of the Commercial Law Article notes, "an affirmative showing by 
the seller that the loss resulted from some action or event following his own 
delivery of the goods can operate as a defense." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
I § 2-314 cmt. 13 (1992). Also, a showing by the seller that it exercised care 
in its manufacture, processing or selection of the product is relevant to whether 
or not the warranty was in fact breached. Id. 
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On the other hand, there are also clear advantages to bringing 
a claim for economic loss under a tort theory. For example, warranty 
liability can be waived through the use of a disclaimer .206 Although 
the General Assembly has extinguished the right of sellers to disclaim 
or limit warranties in the sale of consumer goods/07 there is no 
similar limitation with respeCt to non-consumer goods. In addition, 
the notice requirements of the uec may also prove to be an obstacle 
to recovery. 208 Also, the applicable statute of limitations for a breach 
of warranty may, through the use of boilerplate language, be reduced 
to as short as one year. 209 
IV. RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC LOSS IN CASES 
INVOL VING NEGLIGENT DESIGN OR CONSTRUCTION 
The tort liability of building contractors to third parties has 
generally followed the same path of development as that of manu-
facturers of chattels,2IO although, as Dean Prosser has observed, 
"[t]his was a field in which the ghost of Winterbottom v. Wright 
died very hard. "211 The privity defense was the major obstacle to 
imposing a tort duty on building contractors for negligent design or 
construction. 212 Several other mechanisms also initially shielded con-
tractors from tort liability to third parties. These included the com-
mon-law doctrines of caveat emptor 13 and "merger by deed,"214 and 
206. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316 (1992). 
207. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 2-316.1 (1992). 
208. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I §§ 2-602, 2-607 (1992). While the court of 
appeals has held that a third party beneficiary of a seller's warranties is not 
required to give notice of a breach, the actual purchaser of the product must 
still do so as a prerequisite to recovery. See generally Frericks v. General 
Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 305-06, 336 A.2d 118, 128 (1975). 
209. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 1 § 2-725(1) (1992). 
210. F. HARPER ET AL., supra note 8, § 18.5, at 705-11. 
211. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 104A, at 722 (citing 152 Eng. Rep. 402 
(1842». 
212. See generally Barrett, supra note 12, at 903-05. 
213. Id. The doctrine of caveat emptor, or "buyer beware," barred a purchaser of 
a new home from suing the seller for defects in the home, irrespective of what 
type of damages were incurred-personal injury, property damage, or merely 
economic loss. See Leider, supra note 3, at 947; see also Roberts, The Case 
oj the Unwary Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 
836-37 (1967). 
214. The "merger by deed" doctrine provided that the builder's obligations under 
its contract were "merged" into the deed at closing and were thereby satisfied. 
See Barrett, supra note 12, at 904; see also MiIIison v. Fruchtman, 214 Md. 
515, 518, 136 A.2d 240, 242 (1957) (holding that under Maryland law the 
acceptance of a deed gives rise to prima facie presumption that it is an 
execution of the entire contract of sale and that the rights of the parties are 
to be determined by the deed); Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 
129 A.2d 518 (1957). 
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the "completed and accepted" defense.215 
A. The Liability oj Building Contractors to Third Parties 
As in the case of defective chattels, the traditional rule was that 
a contractor owed no tort duty to the general public, including the 
purchaser of the home. 216 The contractor owed a duty only to the 
developer or general contractor with whom it had privity. 217 In 
determining whether a tort duty might extend to third parties, an 
early line of Maryland cases drew a distinction between two types of 
negligent conduct: (1) non-performance of a contractual duty, or 
"nonfeasance", and (2) improper performance of a contractual duty, 
or "misfeasance. "218 Where a contractor simply did nothing to per-
form a contractual duty-non feasance-it was held that the contrac-
tor could be held liable only to the party to whom contractual duties 
were owed.219 On the other hand, where a contractor performed a 
contractual duty but did so improperly-misfeasance-it was held 
that the contractor could be held liable to third parties as well. 220 
One of the most frequently cited of these early cases is Marlboro 
Shirt Co. v. American District Telegraph Co. ,221 The plaintiff in 
Marlboro Shirt was a tenant in a building whose owner was under 
contract with the defendant, a telegraph company, to install an, 
"automatic central station signaling device" in the building's sprin-
kler system.222 In the event of a water leakage in the sprinkler system, 
the device was intended to send a signal to the office of the defendant, 
who would then notify the proper authorities. 223 The sprinkler system 
soon developed a leak which was not detected by the defendant's 
device and not reported to the telegraph company's office, resulting 
215. Under the "completed and accepted" defense, once construction was completed 
and the work was accepted by the owner, the builder could not be held liable 
to anyone except the owner. See generally Annotation, Negligence of Building 
or Construction Contractor as Condition of Liability upon His Part for Injury 
or Damage to Third Party Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of 
Work, 58 A.L.R.20 865 (1958). 
216. See Huset v. 1.1. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 867-68 (8th Cir. 
1903). 
217. See id. at 867. 
218. Marlboro Shirt Co., Inc. v. American Dis!. Tel. Co., 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 
776 (1950); East Coast Freight Lines, Inc. v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light 
& Power Co., 187 Md. 385, 50 A.2d 246 (1946); Consolidated Gas, Electric 
Light & Power Co. v. Connor, 114 Md. 140,78 A. 725 (1910). 
219. East Coast Freight Lines, 187 Md. at 402-03, 50 A.2d at 254. 
220. Consolidated Gas Co., 114 Md. at 156-57,78 A. at 729; see KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 14, § 93, at 670-71. 
221. 196 Md. 565, 77 A.2d 776 (1951). 
222. Id. at 568, 77 A.2d at 776-77. 
223. [d. 
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in damage to the plaintiff's personal property. 224 In its negligence 
action against the telegraph company, the plaintiff did not allege 
that the company caused the leak, but rather that it failed to detect 
and report the leak.225 The case was therefore one of nonfeasance 
rather than misfeasance. The court of appeals upheld the telegraph 
company's demurrer, holding that "a contractor owes no duty to 
the general public for which it may be responsible in an action in 
tort for negligence, if it does not perform its contract. The duty 
under such contract is only to the one with which the contract is 
made. "226 
One year after the Marlboro Shirt decision, the court of appeals 
abandoned the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction in the case of 
Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert. 227 In Otis Elevator, the plaintiff brought 
a negligence action against an elevator maintenance contractor who 
was under contract with the building owner to maintain the eleva-
tor. 228 The plaintiff was not injured by any mechanical defect in the 
elevator or any failure on the part of the defendant to keep the 
elevator in repair. 229 Rather, the plaintiff alleged that the elevator 
company was negligent because when the plaintiff entered the ele-
vator, it was not level thereby causing the plaintiff to fall twelve and 
one-half inches.230 In defending the claim, the contractor argued that 
it owed no duty to the plaintiff to perform its contract with the 
building company. 231 
224. [d. 
225. [d. at 568-69, 77 A.2d at 777. 
226. [d. at 571-77, 77 A.2d at 778 (emphasis added); accord East Coast Freight 
Lines v. Con'solidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 187 Md. 385, 50 A.2d 
246 (1946) (holding that defendant gas company's failure to perform necessary 
repairs and replacements to public lighting system pursuant to contract with 
Baltimore City was nonfeasance, and that plaintiffs, who were not parties to 
the contract, could not recover against gas company in negligence). 
This quotation from Marlboro Shirt is often misunderstood and interpreted 
overbroadly to mean that a contractor can never be held liable in negligence 
to a third party when that negligence arises out of a contractual obligation. 
See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner 
Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 29-31, 517 A.2d 336, 342-43 (1986). In fact, the 
trial judge in Atlantis, in upholding the demurrers of the defendants, stated 
that he was bound by this statement in Mar/boro Shirt and concluded that 
Maryland law would not recognize a tort duty in the absence of privity under 
the circumstances. [d. at 24, 517 A.2d at 339. The court of appeals in Atlantis 
disagreed and refused to reaffirm the rather stringent holding of Marlboro 
Shirt, finding that Marlboro's general statement "was broader than required 
for the determination of that case." [d. at 30, 517 A.2d at 342. 
227. 198 Md. 585, 84 A.2d 876 (1951). 
228. [d. at 587, 84 A.2d at 876-77. Otis-Elevator was impleaded as a third-party 
defendant by the building owner who was sued by a passenger. [d. 
229. [d. at 595, 84 A.2d at 880. 
230. [d. at 593, 84 A.2d at 879. 
231. [d. at 597, 84 A.2d at 881. 
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The court first noted that the distinction between misfeasance 
and nonfeasance "denotes a difference between absence and existence 
of tort liability, but does not appreciably aid in determining whether 
or not such liability exists. "232 The court stated further that 
[t]he absence of tort liability for breach of contract is not 
qualified by the distinction between non-feasance and mis-
feasance. In such cases such a distinction is not between 
non-performance and 'misperformance' of a contract, but 
only between conduct, in breach of a contract; which con-
stitutes only a breach of a contract and conduct which also 
constitutes a breach of duty, arising out of the nature of 
the work undertaken and the conduct, to third persons. 233 
Because the elevator company had not breached its contract with 
the building owner, the court looked to the scope of the elevator 
company's undertaking apart from its contract with the owner.234. 
The court cited with apparent approval MacPherson v. Buick Motor 
CO.235 for the proposition that "the duty to safeguard life and limb" 
does not grow out of contract and nothing else, but rather "its 
source [is] in the law. "236 In determining whether the elevator com-
pany owed a tort duty independent of the contract, the court held 
that because the defendant had undertaken responsibility only for 
the maintenance and not the operation of the elevator, the defendant 
did not owe a tort duty to the plaintiff. 237 
The Otis Elevator decision marked a turning point in Maryland 
law. The approach taken by the courts thereafter began to focus not 
on the "archaic distinction" 238 between non-feasance and misfea-
sance, but rather on the determination of whether a duty was imposed 
on a defendant to third parties independent of any obligations arising 
out of its contract.239 A tort duty owed to third parties, independent 
232. [d. at 598, 84 A.2d at 882. 
233. [d. at 597-98, 84 A.2d at 881. 
234. [d. at 600-01, 84 A.2d at 883. The court stated that MacPherson "has never 
been expressly approved or disapproved by this court, but has been quoted 
and distinguished .... For present purposes we shall assume that MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Company and the cases which anticipated or followed it are 
law in Maryland." [d. at 599, 84 A.2d at 882. 
235. III N.E. 1050 (N. Y. 1916). 
236. Otis Elevator, 198 I\:1d. at 598, 84 A.2d at 882 (citing MacPherson, III N.E. 
at 1053). 
237. [d. at 601, 84 A.2d at 883. 
238. Matyas v. Suburban Trust Co., 257 Md. 339, 343, 263 A.2d 16, 18 (1970). 
239. See, e.g., id. at 344, 263 A.2d at 19 (holding that "absent a duty exterior to 
the contract ... the mere failure to perform does not provide a foundation 
for an actionable tort"); Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 168 A.2d 
879, 882 (1961) (holding that "[t]he mere negligent breach of a contract, absent 
a duty or obligation imposed by law independent of that arising out of the 
contract itself, is not enough to sustain an action sounding in tort"). 
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of contractual obligations, may have its source in "contract, conduct 
or law."240 For example, in Matyas v. Suburban Trust Co. ,241 the 
court of appeals found that a shopping center tenant whose lease 
agreement with the landlord required it to maintain the sidewalk free 
of ice and snow, did not owe a tort duty "in law" to members of 
the general public who might slip and fall on the sidewalk.242 The 
court noted that no ordinance required property owners to keep 
public sidewalks abutting their property free of ice and snow. 243 
Absent a duty imposed by law and "exterior to the contract" to 
keep the sidewalks clean, the lessor's failure to do so was not 
actionable in tort.244 
In Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 245 the court of special appeals 
indicated that a contractor may owe a tort duty to third parties when 
it assumes a supervisory role in performing its contract. In Cutlip, 
the plaintiffs' decedent, an iron worker, was killed when a portion 
of the building he was working on collapsed. 246 The plaintiffs sued 
the architect, who was under contract with the owner of the property, 
for negligence on the novel theory that an architect's liability may 
extend to third parties when he has assumed additional supervisory 
responsibilities arising from his contract with the owner. 247 The 
architect's additional supervisory responsibilities in Cutlip arose from 
his agreement to provide Prince George's County with a field in-
spection report for the property, in order to procure the building 
permit required by the architect's contract with the owner. 248 The 
court in Cutlip did not, decide whether the liability of an architect 
extends in all cases to the public,249 but did find that in circumstances 
where an architect retains supervision of construction and takes on 
additional supervisory responsibilities, he owes a duty to the general 
public, including the builder's employees, to ensure safe construc-
tion.250 The court was not entirely clear whether this duty arose out 
of the contract or by operation of law. The court stated, however, 
that the architect's "contract with the county to assume additional 
240. Kreiger v. J.E. Greiner Co., Inc., 282 Md. 50, 57, 382 A.2d 1069, 1073 (1978). 
241. 257 Md. 339, 263 A.2d 16 (1970). 
242. Id. at 344, 263 A.2d at 19. 
243. Id. at 341, 263 A.2d at 17. 
244. Id. at 344, 263 A.2d at 19. 
245. 22 Md. App. 673, 325 A.2d 432 (1974). 
246. Id. at 676, 325 A.2d at 434. 
247. Id. at 686-87, 325 A.2d at 440. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 694-96, 325 A.2d at 444. The court noted that other jurisdictions have 
recognized this general tort duty on the part of architects. [d. at 693, 325 A.2d 
at 443 (citing Erhart v. Hummonds, 334 S. W .2d 869 (Ark. 1960». 
250. Id. at 693-95, 325 A.2d at 443-44. 
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supervisory responsibilities clearly subjected him to a duty which 
encompassed the decedent. "251 
In Kreiger v. J.E. Greiner CO.,252 decided shortly after Cutlip, 
the court of appeals addressed the liability of supervisory engineers. 
The plaintiff in Kreiger was injured while working on the construction 
of a bridge. 253 He sued the project's engineers, who were under 
contract with the State Roads Commission to design the bridge and 
provide overall supervision of its construction.254 The court noted 
that "[i]t is elementary that for there to be liability on the part of 
these engineers such liability would have to arise by virtue of a duty 
under contract, conduct, or law. "255 The court, however, did not 
confront the question of whether a duty on the part of the engineers 
arose by operation of law. Instead, it focused upon the language of 
the engineers' contracts with the state, and found that these contracts 
did not place upon the engineers a duty to supervise safety in 
connection with the construction and did not hold them responsible 
for life and property generally.256 The duty of the engineers under 
the contracts was simply "to assure a certain end result, a completed 
bridge which complie[d] with the plans and specifications. "257 
The plaintiffs also alleged that the engineers had assumed other 
responsibilities, aside from the contract, for the safety of the workers, 
including the obligation to stop the work when it '''was being 
performed in a negligent and dangerous manner which was unsafe 
for the workmen." '258 The court did not address this argument 
because it found that the engineers' contracts with the state negated 
the allegation that they were required to supervise the work for 
safety.259 
Another potential source of duty for contractors, independent 
of any contract, is the building code. In Gardenvil/age Realty Corp. 
v. Russo,2fIJ a tenant and her mother sued the owner of their residence, 
251. [d. at 694, 325 A.2d at 444. 
252. 282 Md. 50, 382 A.2d 1069 (1978). 
253. [d. at 52, 382 A.2d 1070. 
254. [d. 
255. [d. at 56-57, 382 A.2d at 1073 (emphasis added). How elementary this prop-
osition was at the time this case was decided is questionable. Notably, the 
court cited no cases in support of this statement. 
256. [d. at 68-69, 382 A.2d at 1079. 
257. [d. at 69, 382 A.2d at 1079. 
258. [d. at 69-70, 382 A.2d at 1079. 
259. [d. at 70, 382 A.2d at 1080. The concurring opinion argued that the complaint 
alleged facts sufficient to establish a cause of action against the engineers on 
the theory that they voluntarily assumed and then breached a duty of care 
owed to the plaintiff, independent of any contractual obligations undertaken 
in their contract with the state. [d. at 70-71, 382 A.2d at 1080. 
260. 34 Md. App. 25, 366 A.2d 101 (1976). 
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the general contractor, and others for personal Injuries when a 
concrete slab porch collapsed at their residence. 261 The evidence 
revealed that the concrete slab was latently defective and not con-
structed in accordance with the Baltimore City Building Code.262 The 
court found that the building code imposed a "non-delegable, affir-
mative duty" upon the owner to insure compliance with the code. 263 
In 1986, the court of appeals took a decidedly different approach 
to the determination of whether a contractor owes a tort duty to 
third parties. In Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. 
v. Whiting- Turner Contracting CO.,264 the court reviewed decisions 
in both Maryland and other jurisdictions,265 and determined for the 
first time that "privity is not an absolute prerequisite to the existence 
of a tort duty."266 Rather, the court found that the issue of whether 
a contractor's tort duty extends to third parties should be resolved 
by the traditional negligence standard of foreseeability. 267 
Perhaps the death knell to the privity defense was struck in St. 
James Construction Co. v. Morlock. 268 The court of special appeals 
in St. James held that corporate officers and employees of a building 
contractor can be held personally liable for economic loss, despite 
the lack of privity with the homeowner .269 The court refused to 
recognize "'subordinate tiers of privity between corporate "builders" 
and their officers and employees." '270 Rather, the court found that 
the general rule holding corporate agents personally liable for their 
active participation in corporate torts should apply in actions brought 
under A tlan tis. 271 The court reasoned that the Atlantis decision sought 
to allocate risks to those best able to avoid such risks by "substituting 
foreseeability for contractual privity as the principal determinant of 
duty."272 
261. [d. at 26-27, 366 A.2d at 103. 
262. [d. at 28, 366 A.2d at 104. 
263. [d. at 39, 336 A.2d at 110. The violation of a building code does not, however, 
constitute negligence per se. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 
342,362,517 A.2d 1122, 1132 (1986). It may be considered evidence of 
negligence if three conditions are met: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the 
class of persons the code was designed to protect, (2) the injury suffered is of 
the type the statute was designed to prevent, and (3) the plaintiff demonstrates 
that the code violation was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. [d. 
264. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986). 
265. [d. at 27-32, 517 A.2d at 341-43. 
266. [d. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343. 
267. [d. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343-44. 
268. 89 Md. App. 217, 597 A.2d 1042 (1991). 
269. [d. at 223-24, 597 A.2d at 1045. 
270. [d. 
271. [d. at 223, 597 A.2d at 1045. 
272. [d. at 224, 597 A.2d at 1045. 
1994] Economic Loss 
B. Atlantis and the Liability oj Building Contractors Under 
Maryland Law Jor Economic Loss 
557 
In the area of construction defects, courts throughout the country 
have been more willing to extend tort liability to damages for purely 
economic harm than in the context of product defects. A significant 
number of states now permit recovery of purely economic losses in 
negligence actions against architects, developers, designers, and other 
building contractors.273 Maryland courts have been slow to address 
the economic loss doctrine in the construction area. Not until 1986, 
in the seminal case of Council oj Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium 
v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.,m did the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland directly confront the issue. In Atlantis, a condominium 
association brought a negligence action against the developer, the 
general contractor, and the architects of the Atlantis Condominium 
in Ocean City, alleging that the utility shafts and related electrical 
work at the condominium were constructed in violation of the 
building code and the project's plans and specifications. 275 No per-
sonal injury or damage to property other than the condominium had 
occurred, but the defendants' negligence had created a risk of per-
sonal injury to the condominium's unit owners.276 The defendants 
argued that, in the absence of privity of contract, they owed no tort 
duty to the unit owners.277 Alternatively, they argued that they did 
not owe a duty because the unit owners had suffered only economic 
loss, not personal injury or property damage.278 
The court of appeals rejected both of these arguments: 
In following the modern trend, we hold that privity is not 
an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a tort duty. The 
duty of the architects and the builders in this case, to use 
due care in the design,· inspection and construction of this 
condominium extended to those persons Joreseeably subject 
to the risk oj personal injury created, as here, by a latent 
273. For the leading cases permitting recovery of economic loss in negligence against 
contractors, see J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979); Barnes v. 
Mac Brown & Co., Inc., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976); Oates v. Jag, Inc., 333 
S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1985); Quail Hollow East Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. 
Scholz Co., 268 S.E.2d 12 (N .C. Ct. App. 1980); Juliano v. Gaston, 455 A.2d 
523 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. 
Co., 384 S.E.2d 730 (S.c. 1989); Terlinde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 
1980); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974). 
274. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986). 
275. [d. at 21-22, 517 A.2d at 338-39. 
276. [d. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338. 
277. [d. at 23, 517 A.2d at 339. 
278. [d. at 23-24, 517 A.2d at 339. 
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and unreasonably dangerous condition resulting from their 
negligence. 279 
The court concluded that the determination of whether a tort duty 
should be imposed should depend upon "the risk generated by the 
negligent conduct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of 
the nature of the resultant damage. "280 Personal injury or property 
damage, the court stated, is not a prerequisite to finding such a 
duty.281 Where there is merely a risk of death or personal injury, 
regardless of whether privity exists, a plaintiff may recover the 
"reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition. "282 The court 
reasoned that a risk of injury will suffice because a home buyer 
should not have to wait for a personal tragedy to occur in order to 
recover damages to remedy or repair existing defects.283 
Thus, the court of appeals in Atlantis held for the first time 
that economic losses-in this case, the costs of remedying code 
violations and other dangerous conditions in the condominium's 
construction-were recoverable in a negligence action against parties 
with whom the plaintiffs enjoyed no privity.284 This was the first 
decision in Maryland to make such a holding, either in the context 
of construction or product defects. 
The court of appeals expressly limited its holding in Atlantis to 
instances where the plaintiff is seeking recovery solely for economic 
damages where a risk of personal injury is also present. The court 
has not addressed the question of whether risk of property damage 
would support a tort duty.285 In Jacques v. First National Bank of 
279. [d. at 32, 517 A.2d at 343-44 (emphasis added). 
280. [d. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345. 
281. [d. 
282. [d. 
283. [d. The court of appeals, however, stated that in the absence of actual injury 
the nature of the risk must be serious. [d. at 35 n.5, 517 A.2d at 345 n.5. 
Conditions which present a risk to general health, welfare, or comfort but fall 
short of presenting a clear danger of death or personal injury will not suffice. 
[d. Thus, what constitutes .. a clear danger of death or personal injury" will 
vary from case to case. 
284. Although the court did not expressly state that economic losses were recoverable 
in such instances, this is clearly the court's holding. [d. at 21, 517 A.2d at 
338; see Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 307-08, 550 A.2d 
389, 401 (1988) (characterizing "risk of death or personal injury" incurred as 
a result of design and structural defects to plaintiffs' boat as economic loss). 
285. In contrast to the Atlantis and Drexel decisions, courts in other states have 
not made a distinction on the basis of the nature of the risk generated by a 
contractor's conduct. For instance, in Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Man-
ufacturing Co., 384 S.E.2d 730 (S.C. 1989), the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina found a legal duty on the part of a builder to refrain from constructing 
a house that he knows or should know will pose serious risks of physical harm, 
either to persons or property. [d. at 737. This duty, according to the court, 
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Maryland,286 however, the court set forth, in general terms, when a 
tort duty for economic loss will be recognized. Although Jacques 
does not involve the liability of a building contractor for economic 
loss, it clarifies the court's holding in Atlantis and is thus important 
to this discussion. 
The plaintiffs in Jacques, Mr. and Mrs. Jacques, had entered 
into a residential sales contract with a third party that was contingent 
upon their ability to obtain a conventional loan for the balance of 
the contract price.287 They submitted an application for a loan to the 
defendant, First National Bank. 288 An officer of the bank subse-
quently notified the plaintiffs that the loan they qualified for would 
not cover the balance of the contract price.289 When the Jacques 
requested that the bank deny their application outright, the bank 
refused. 290 The Jacques proceeded to settlement with the bank's loan 
after acquiring the balance of the money through personal loans 
from relatives and a short-term personal loan of $50,000 from the 
bank.291 
The Jacques sued the bank for malicious interference with con-
tract, gross negligence, and negligence. 292 The court of appeals de-
termined that a contract existed between the bank and the Jacques 
by virtue of statements made by the bank's officer and that this 
contract included an implied promise to use reasonable care.293 The 
issue for the court was whether a concomitant tort duty existed under 
the circumstances. 294 
The court first reiterated that the mere negligent breach of a 
contract will not alone sustain an action 'sounding in tort. 295 In 
was imposed by virtue of the applicable building code, construction industry 
standards, and public policy. [d. (citations omitted). As the court of appeals 
did in At/antis, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reasoned that a plaintiff 
need not wait for physical harm to occur before he or she can recover in 
negligence. [d. A builder, the court stated, "is no less blameworthy in such a 
case where lady luck has smiled upon him and no physical harm has yet 
occurred." [d. The court concluded that a builder may be liable in tort despite 
the fact that only economic harm was incurred where the builder has (I) 
violated a building code, (2) deviated from industry standards, or (3) constructed 
a house that he knows or should know will pose a serious risk of physical 
harm. [d. at 738. 
286. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986). 
287. [d. at 528-29, 515 A.2d at 756-57. 
288. [d. at 529, 515 A.2d at 757. 
289. [d. at 530, 515 A.2d at 757. 
290. [d. 
291. [d. 
292. [d. at 530-31, 515 A.2d at 757-58. 
293. [d. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762. 
294. [d. 
295. [d. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759 (quoting Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 
168 A.2d 879, 882 (1961». 
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determining whether a tort duty should be recognized, the court held 
that there are two major considerations: "[T]he nature of the harm 
likely to result from a failure to exercise due care, and the relationship 
that exists between the parties. "296 Applying these two factors, the 
court found that because the nature of the harm involved here was 
merely economic loss, an "intimate nexus" was required between the 
parties as a condition to imposing tort liability. 297 This intimate nexus, 
the court stated, could be satisfied only by contractual privity or its 
equivalent. 298 
Thus, the court of appeals recognized a sliding scale approach 
to determining the existence of a tort duty: 
We discern from our review of the development of the law 
of tort duty that an inverse correlation exists between the 
nature of the risk on one hand, and the relationship of the 
parties on the other. As the magnitude of the risk increases, 
the requirement of privity is relaxed-thus justifying the 
imposition of a duty in favor of a large class of persons 
where the risk is of death or personal injury. Conversely, 
as the magnitude of the risk decreases, a closer relationship 
between the parties must be shown to support a tort duty. 
Therefore, if the risk created by negligent conduct is no 
greater than one of economic loss, generally no tort duty 
will be found absent a showing of privity or its equivalent. 299 
The court held that this intimate nexus requirement had been 
satisfied.3°O The court reasoned that, in light of the extraordinary 
financing provisions of the sales contract, the bank had undertaken 
a significant responsibility when it agreed to process the Jacques' 
application and determine the amount for which they qualified. 301 
The court also considered the nature of the banking industry as a 
"public calling," and noted that "[t]he law generally recognizes a 
tort duty of due care arising from contractual dealings with profes-
sionals such as physicians, attorneys, architects, and public account-
ants. "302 The court concluded that a cause of action in negligence 
exists when a bank "fail[s] to exercise that degree of care which a 
296. [d. 
297. [d. 
298. [d. at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60. The court further stated that where the risk 
created is one of personal injury, it is unnecessary to establish a direct 
relationship, and foreseeability becomes the principle determinant of a tort 
duty. [d. at 535, 515 A.2d at 760. 
299. [d. at 537, 515 A.2d at 761. 
300. [d. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762. 
301. [d. at 540, 515 A.2d at 762-63. 
302. [d. at 541, 515 A.2d at 763. 
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reasonably prudent bank would have exercised under the same or 
similar circumstances.' '303 
Thus, the Jacques decision clarifies the court's holding in Atlantis 
by more fully describing when a tort duty to avoid economic loss 
will be recognized under Maryland law, particularly when the result-
ing harm is other than a risk of personal injury. The determinative 
factors will be (1) the nature of the harm likely to result from the 
negligent conduct, without the necessity of actual harm occurring, 
and (2) the relationship that exists between the parties. 304 
C. Recovery of Economic Loss Against Contractors Under Other 
Causes of Action 
The court of appeals has also recently discussed the recovery of 
economic loss in the context of a negligent misrepresentation action, 
indicating that it will broadly apply the "intimate nexus" test. In 
Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United States Gypsum CO.,305 a 
condominium's unit owners sued the developer and architect of the 
project for defective design and construction of the condominium's 
exterior walls. 306 The developer and architect, in turn, brought a third 
party negligent misrepresentation action against United States Gyp-
sum, who they alleged had issued a publication containing the spec-
ifications for the curtain wall system used in constructing the 
condominium. 307 The third-party claim contended that United States 
Gypsum's design in the publication was defective and contained 
misrepresentations which were relied upon by the architect when 
designing the condominium's walls. 308 
In determining whether United States Gypsum owed a tort duty 
to the developer and architect, the court cited the factors established 
in Atlantis and Jacques-the relationship between the parties and the 
nature of the actual or foreseeable harm.309 The court noted that 
303. [d. at 544, 515 A.2d at 764. 
304. [d. at.534, 515 A.2d at 759. This is provided that the risk involved is of death 
or personal injury rather than to the general health, welfare or comfort of the 
plaintiff. Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner 
Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 35 n.5, 517 A.2d 336, 345 n.5 (1986). 
305. 315 Md. 741, 556 A.2d 1126 (1989). 
306. [d. at 745-46, 556 A.2d at 1127-28. 
307. [d. at 747-49, 556 A.2d at 1128-30. The court did not discuss the liability of 
the developer and architect to the unit owners. Apparently, the developer 
settled with the unit owners prior to the appeal. [d. at 744 n.2, 556 A.2d at 
1127 n.2. 
308. [d. at 747-49, 556 A.2d at 1128-30. 
309. [d. at 751-53, 556 A.2d at 1131-32. The court also cited the following factors 
set forth in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 
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although Atlantis involved negligent conduct, "similar principles 
apply when negligent misrepresentation is involved. "310 The court 
assumed that the third-party plaintiffs were seeking recovery for 
economic loss and. considered the evidence of an "intimate nexus" 
or of "a limitation of the group of those who might be harmed 
sufficient to avoid the 'specter of unlimited liability, with claims 
devastating in number and amount crushing the defendant because 
of momentary lapse from proper care."'311 In doing so, the court 
interpreted the "intimate nexus" requirement very broadly, and 
found that although United States Gypsum had not sold the design 
specifications directly to the third-party plaintiffs, there was evidence 
that it had the "specific intent" that architects and developers in 
general would adopt those specifications.312 The court concluded that 
"it is safe to say [that the defendant] did not develop and publish 
these detailed drawings, specifications, and technical data tables for 
some altruistic motive.' '313 
The federal district court of Maryland did not consider the 
existence of an intimate nexus when deciding Flow Industries, Inc. 
v. Fields Construction CO. 314 In Flow, a general contractor, Hanks 
Contracting, sued the manufacturer and distributor of pump motors 
for allegedly making negligent misrepresentations regarding the deliv-
ery date for the pumps.315 The pumps were not delivered until nearly 
ten months after the date specified in the purchase order, despite 
repeated assurances by the distributor that they would soon be 
delivered.316 As a result, Hanks Contracting suffered economic 10sses.317 
Hanks had privity with neither the manufacturer nor the distributor, 
1078, 1083 (1986): 
[T)he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty 
that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral 
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing 
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence 
of insurance for the risk involved. 
Village of Cross Keys, 315 Md. at 752, 556 A.2d at 1131 (quoting Tarasoff v. 
Regents of U niv. of Cal., 551 P .2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976». 
310. [d. at 754, 556 A.2d at 1132. 
311. [d. at 757-58, 556 A.2d at 1133-34 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 107 (4th ed. 1971». 
312. [d. at 758, 556 A.2d at 1134. 
313. [d. 
314. 683 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1988). 
315. [d. at 529. 
316. [d. 
317. [d. The court's opinion does not identify the nature of the economic losses. 
Presumably, the general contractor incurred lost profits as a result of the delay. 
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since the pumps were ordered from the distributor by one of Hanks' 
subcontractors. 318 Applying Jacques, the district court found that 
there was no "special relationship" between the parties that would 
constitu'te privity or its equivalent.319 Indeed, "the parties had delib-
erately structured their relationships, against the background of well-
established construction law and practice, to insulate themselves from 
one another. "320 The court concluded that "[to] disregard these 
relationships and to find the substantial equivalence of privity where 
the parties themselves had intentionally avoided it would be contrary 
to reason. "321 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under the majority approach, the economic loss doctrine holds 
malll,lfacturers and building contractors liable to third parties only 
when some identifiable physical harm has been incurred to either 
persons or to property other than the product or building structure 
itself.322 When the harm is incurred to only the product or structure, 
courts adopting the economic loss doctrine deny recovery in tort. 323 
. This approach is certainly justifiable when the resulting harm is 
purely pecuniary or qualitative in nature. Contract and warranty law, 
r~ther than tort law, provide the appropriate remedy in such in-




321. Id. Interestingly, with regard to the distributor's negligent misrepresentation 
claim against the manufacturer, the court took a different approach. Although 
these parties were in privity, and Jacques might suggest that they owed a duty 
of care to one another, the court stated that Jacques was not a negligent 
misrepresentation case. Id. at 529-30. The court of appeals in Jacques 
did not pretend to foretell all of the circumstances under which a tort 
duty will be imposed upon parties in a direct relationship with each 
other. Thus, it is too facile to posit the equation that Martens 
Chevrolet plus Jacques automatically equals a tort duty upon those 
in privity to use reasonable care in what they say to one another. 
Id. at 530. The court reasoned that to hold that "a contractual relationship 
itself provides the duty of care necessary for the maintenance of a negligent 
misrepresentation claim would be to turn the principle into a syllogism. The 
contract, in effect, would become an 'independent duty imposed by law.'" Id. 
The district court concluded that where "the controversy concerns purely 
economic losses allegedly caused by statements made during the course of a 
contractual relationship between businessmen, it is plainly contract law which 
should provide the rules and principles by which the case is to be governed." 
Id. In effect, the district court in Flow Industries turned the "intimate nexus" 
requirement in Jacques on its head. 
322. See supra note 44. 
323 .. See supra note 44. 
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harm is actual physical damage to the product or structure. Regardless 
of whether this type of harm occurs in a "sudden and calamitous" 
manner, the policy reasons in favor of the economic loss doctrine 
do not support denying liability. Neither contract principles nor 
warranty law are designed to allow recovery for physical harm to 
the product itself. Rather, tort law imposes on all persons a standard 
of reasonable care to avoid causing foreseeable harm to the property 
or to the person of another. Any distinction between physical damage 
to the product itself and physical damage to other property is 
arbitrary. For instance, if a newly purchased boat has plumbing 
problems that result in water damage to the boat's carpeting, the 
owner should not be denied recovery in tort merely because no 
damage has occurred to other property or to the owner himself. Yet, 
most courts in the country would characterize the damage to the 
carpeting as an economic loss and deny recovery because no damage 
to other property or persons was incurred. . 
Maryland law, in contrast, recognizes that foreseeability should. 
be the principal factor in the determination of whether a tort duty 
extends to third parties.324 The nature of the harm resulting from a 
defendant's negligence is irrelevant. 325 Under Atlantis and its progeny, 
where a mere risk of personal injury results from a contractor's or 
a manufacturer's negligence, the plaintiff, as well as all others 
foreseeably subject to this risk, may recover damages, including 
economic losses. An action will lie for the reasonable cost of cor-
recting the dangerous condition regardless of whether actual harm 
has yet occurred. 326 
In sum, the significance of Atlantis and the recent Morris and 
A.J. Decoster decisions cannot be overstated. The Maryland courts 
have now adopted a consistent approach, applicable in both the 
construction and products liability contexts, that restores the appli-
cation of traditional tort standards and dismisses arbitrary distinctions 
based on the nature of the harm resulting from negligent conduct. 
Michael R. McCann 
324. Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18,35,517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986). 
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